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Abstract:  Dozens of U.S. soldiers are killed each year as a result of both combat and motor 
vehicle accidents.  The objective of this study is to look beyond the events and symptoms of 
accidents which normally indicate human error, and instead study the complex and poorly 
understood upper-level organizational processes and problems that may constitute the actual 
root causes of accidents – this is particularly challenging because the causes often involve non-
linear dynamic phenomena and have behaviors that are counter-intuitive to normal human 
thinking, these are often called “wicked” problems.  After reviewing the available literature, a 
System Dynamics model was created to provide an analytical model of this multifaceted system 
that allows for extensive simulation.  The results of these simulations suggest that high-level 
decisions that balance mission rate and operations tempo with troop availability, careful 
management of the work-rest cycle for deployed troops, and improvement of the processes for 
evaluating the lessons learned from accidents, will lead to a reduction in Army combat and 
motor vehicle accidents.   
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Despite extraordinary efforts by Army 
leaders at all levels, an alarming number of 
soldiers die or are severely injured each year 
from accidents that could have been 
prevented.  Currently, the Army uses a 
qualitative and methodical risk management 
process called Composite Risk Management 
(CRM) to help manage operational and 
training risk.1  While the CRM process has 
produced tremendous improvements in 
accident prevention, both it and the results 
of most Army accident investigations (the 
primary source of institutional safety 
learning) tend to focus predominantly on the 
immediate events and symptoms of 
accidents.  Consequently, the results of most 
safety investigations indicate “human error” 
as the primary cause of accidents - much 
like the magician who performs his magic 
by distracting the audience, we are easily 
 
 
distracted away from the real causes of 
accidents. If we are to solve this problem, 
we must recognize that there are highly 
complex, dynamic, and non-linear 
phenomena involved that defy our normal 
capabilities to manage and engineer 
effective responses – that is they are 
“wicked” problems.  To solve them we must 
explore the rarely examined organizational 
processes and problems that contribute to 
accidents.   
 
Thus, the objective of this study is to 
develop a model that helps Army policy 
makers to better understand the effects of 
various dynamic feedback processes and 
delays involved with decision making, 
specifically in regards to accident 
prevention.  This study focuses on high-level 
dynamic organizational factors that impact 
safety, which will help policy makers to 
better understand which levers in the system 
play the biggest role in risk mitigation.   
 
2.  Background & Context 
 
2.1  Vehicle Accidents & Investigations 
 
Since the beginning of the war in Iraq in 
2003, approximately 20% of the Army’s 
combat deaths have been caused by non-
combat events (about 600 total as of January 
2007).  In comparison, 28% of deaths were 
non-combat related during WWII and 49.5% 
were non-combat related during the Gulf 
War.2  Roughly 40% of the total non-combat 
deaths in Iraq (about 250 total) were caused 
by combat vehicle or motor vehicle 
accidents.  These numbers, while better than 
the historical precedent, are still staggering 
and represent the number of accidents from 
Iraq only; they do not include other 
accidents within the Army.   
 
A review of Army vehicle accident reports 
reveals that the results of most investigations 
cite human error as the primary cause of the 
accident.  Furthermore, according to these 
reports factors such as complacency, poor 
supervision, fatigue, lack of mission 
awareness, pressure to perform, and 
perceived conflicts with operational 
necessities are often involved in the 
mechanisms of an accident.  While almost 
all accident investigations take into account 
the events and symptoms of an accident as 
well as the conditions and surface indicators, 
only on rare occasions do accident 
investigations include organizational 
problems which are usually the “root cause” 
of accidents.3  This typical framework for 
safety analysis can be seen in Figure 2-1 
below.  It is critical to note that this 
phenomenon tends to occur in all types of 
organizations.  For example, in his study of 
high-hazard industries in the private sector, 
John Carroll notes that most accident 
investigations produce problem diagnoses 
that are worker centric, resulting in 
extensive written detailed procedures and 
discipline.  This leads to added job 
complexity and a reduction in trust between 
workers and management, which leads to 
slower work speed, alienation of workers, 
and a reduced flow of information between 
supervisors and their subordinates.  
Naturally, this leads to increased problems 
and therefore, a cycle of accumulating 
problems, accidents, and worker 
resentment.4 
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Figure 2-1 Safety Analysis Framework5 
 
 
2.2 System Dynamics 
 
System Dynamics was developed during the 
1950s by MIT Professor Jay Forrester as a 
method for modeling large real world 
systems.  Central to the System Dynamics 
modeling strategy is the representation of 
system structure in terms of stocks and 
flows, which measure the accumulation and 
dissipation of material or information over a 
period of time.  Feedback loops are 
connected to these stocks and flows and 
serve as the building blocks for expressing 
the relationships between variables and 
overall dynamic behavior of complex 
interdependencies on the system.  A key 
aspect of System Dynamics theory is the 
recognition of complex interdependencies 
among multiple feedback loops, and a 
rejection of simple linear cause-and-effect 
thinking, since in most systems the “effect” 
might also affect the “cause.”   
 
In System Dynamics models a “+” sign 
indicates a positive polarity between 
variables (i.e. as in Figure 2-2, as the 
number of Accidents increases, the level of 
Organizational Stress also increases).  
Similarly, a “-“ link indicates a negative 
polarity between variables (i.e. as Safety 
Precautions increases, the number of 
Accidents decreases).  The loop indicators 
such as “B1” indicate whether the loop is a 
balancing (B) or reinforcing (R) feedback 
loop as well as the loop identifier number (1, 
2, 3…) which is used to distinguish between 
loops.  Thus, loop “B1” should be read as 
“Balancing Loop 1.”   In reinforcing 
feedback loops, as seen in Figure 2-2, an 
increase in one variable (in this case 
Accidents) produces an increase in another 
variable (Organizational Stress), which then 
causes a greater increase in Accidents.  In 
balancing feedback loops, however, an 
increase in one variable (in this case 
Accidents) produces an increase in another 
variable (Safety Precautions), which 
ultimately causes a decrease in the original 
variable.  Finally, a causal arrow with two 
perpendicular straight lines, represents a 
delay in the system.   
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Figure 2-2 Reinforcing and Balancing Loops 
 
3.  Modeling Vehicle Safety 
 
3.1  The High-Level Diagram 
 
After a review of the literature and framing 
of the problem and research objectives, a 
high-level causal loop diagram was created 
to help determine the specific domain of the 
system and to better frame the key variables 
that might be used in a detailed model of the 
system.  This high-level diagram was 
necessary for identifying and quantifying 
key variables which would help to focus 
efforts for subsequent data collection.  Both 
the variables themselves and the direction of 
causality between variables were determined 
by examining over 500 Class A and B 
accident reports between the years 1998 and 
2006 (accident reports were provided by the 
U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center), and 
by reviewing similar non-military safety 
studies from both public and private sectors.  
Figure 3-1 below is a depiction of the high-
level diagram developed for this study. 
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Figure 3-1 High-Level Model of Vehicle Safety 
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3.2 Proof of Concept Model 
 
After collecting data, a proof of concept 
model was created.  This process 
transformed the concept model of Figure 3-1 
into a low-level and more detailed model 
that uses model parameters for exogenous  
variables and equations for endogenous 
variables to create a mathematical model of 
the system that can be simulated by 
changing various exogenous variables over 
time.  Figure 3-2 shows a depiction of the 
proof of concept model.  
 
3.3 Calibrating the Proof of Concept Model 
 
Once the model was built a number of tests 
were conducted including sensitivity testing 
and extreme conditions testing to ensure the 
model exhibited plausible behavior.  
Sensitivity testing was conducted by 
examining how sensitive the model reacted 
to small changes in various model 
parameters.  In addition, the model was 
tested under extreme conditions such as a 
range from zero soldiers deployed to 500 
million soldiers deployed to ensure the 
model behaved sensibly even under 
unrealistically extreme conditions.  Once the 
model was deemed sound, a final calibration 
was conducted.  In conducting the 
calibration for this model, the time period 
from 1998-2006 was used to validate the 
model.  Time Step 12 represents the rise of 
the Kosovo (KFOR) mission in 1999, time 
step 48 represents the invasion of 
Afghanistan (OEF-Operation Enduring 
Freedom) in 2002, and time step 60 
represents the invasion of Iraq (OIF-
Operation Iraqi Freedom) in 2003.  Arrays 
of data were used to adjust the exogenous 
variables Enemy Threat, Mission 
Requirements, and Number of Soldiers 
Deployed across each of the three time 
steps.  As seen in Figure 3-3, the simulated 
accident rate is very close to the actual 
historical accident rate.  It is important to 
note that the historical data represents the 
annual average accident rate for each year, 
and therefore in reality would be more 
stochastic in nature. 
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Figure 3-3 Model Calibration Results 
 
4.  Learning from the Model 
 
After calibrating the model, several dozen 
simulations were conducted with this model.  
Three of the most insightful simulation 
scenarios are discussed below. 
 
4.1 Oscillations in Enemy Threat 
 
A series of simulations were conducted to 
determine what effect an oscillation in the 
magnitude of the enemy threat would have 
on the system.  These simulations were 
conducted with the intention of replicating 
how enemy activity is exhibited in many 
extended conflicts such as Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Vietnam.    Especially in low-intensity 
warfare, it is very difficult for the insurgent 
to maintain a constant level of offensive 
operations, as they periodically need to rest, 
refit, and develop new strategies and tactics.   
 
As seen in Figure 4-1, oscillations in the 
Enemy Threat can produce fewer accidents 
over time.  A careful study of the system 
 
 
showed that Long Term Stress Level does 
not accumulate to as great an extent when 
the threat oscillates as it does when the 
threat is constant, despite the same total 
threat over time.  This is because the system 
has time to recover and “burn off” stress 
when the Enemy Threat level is lower.  This 
same phenomenon occurs with fatigue in the 
system.    
IMPORTANT Finding:  An Oscillating Enemy Threat produces less accidents despite the 
same total enemy threat over time…Why?  Because Long Term Stress and Fatigue do not 
reach the same level as they do when the system remains constant
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Figure 4-1 Impact of Oscillations in Enemy Threat 
 
Figure 4-2 is an extension of this idea and 
shows that the same basic results apply 
among a wide range of values for 
amplitudes.  
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threat over time in all cases, those with increased oscillations in enemy threat clearly 
exhibit fewer accidents.
 
Figure 4-2 Impact of Larger Oscillations 
 
The greatest improvements in the system 
occur when the greatest amplitudes are 
applied.  This finding seems to suggest the 
importance of rotating Soldiers “off the line” 
and home on leave more frequently.  It 
shows that Soldiers who are exposed to high 
levels of enemy threat followed by equal 
periods of rest, where rest in this context is 
defined as non-exposure to an enemy threat, 
will be less likely to have accidents. 
 
4.2 Multivariate Simulation 
 
Several multivariate experiments were also 
conducted to determine the impact that 
changing multiple variables simultaneously 
has on the system.  As can be seen in Figure 
4-3, the Enemy Threat, Mission 
Requirements and Number of Soldiers 
Deployed were increased simultaneously to 
see what effect it would have on the system.  
One important finding is that even minor 
increases in the Enemy Threat and Mission 
Requirements can cause significant 
increases in the Accident Rate, if the 
Number of Troops Deployed is not 
increased proportionately.  This suggests 
that careful management of the troop-to-task 
ratio at a macro level of control is requisite 
to reducing combat vehicle accidents.  
Hence, if commanders on the ground are 
given too many missions to accomplish 
under hostile conditions, without enough 
troops to effectively share the burden, an 
unnecessary number of vehicle accidents 
will occur. 
IMPORTANT Finding:  Even minor increases of .0125 (1.25%) for enemy threat and 25,000 
for mission requirements produces a disastrous impact on accident rate and total 
accidents, IF the number of troops deployed is not also increased proportionately
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Figure 4-3  Multiple Variables at a Time 
 
 
 
4.3  Troop Reduction Example 
 
Finally, a hypothetical but plausible example 
of how this model might be used to assess 
the effects of a potential policy alternative is 
shown below.  Several simulations were 
conducted, to determine the impact of 
various scaling options for a troop 
withdrawal.  In one scenario troops were 
withdrawn from a war zone using a scaled 
approach where the mission rate and enemy 
threat were decreased proportionately over 
time with the number of troops in theater 
over a period of 24 months.  In the second 
scenario, the troops were withdrawn along 
the same timeline, but the number of 
required missions and the enemy threat was 
held constant for the first 12 months, and 
then decreased at a faster rate during the last 
12 months of the withdrawal.  Figures 4-4 
and 4-5 show the effect of these simulations 
on the Accident Rate and total Accidents 
respectively.   
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Figure 4-4 Troop Reduction Scenario 
 
As the graphs in Figures 4-4 and 4-5 show, 
there are serious unintended consequences 
involved with conducting a troop 
withdrawal that is not phased 
proportionately with a decrease in Enemy 
Threat and Mission Requirements.  The 
graphs of Complacency and Immediate 
Stress Level, Figures 4-6 and 4-7 
respectively, explain this phenomenon.   
IMPORTANT Finding: 
• Any troop withdraw must be carefully scaled with a concurrent and proportional decrease 
in mission rate and enemy threat in order to avoid excessive complacency and fatigue that 
lead to accidents
• Same model behavior with constant enemy threat as with decreasing enemy threat, only 
exception is constant enemy threat (i.e. no reduction of enemy threat) produces a greater 
number of accidents proportionately)
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Figure 4-5  Troop Reduction Scenario 
 
The simulations show that Stress and 
Complacency are much greater in the case 
where the withdrawal is un-scaled.  As can 
be seen in Figure 4-4, this translates to a 
much greater Accident Rate for the un-
scaled withdrawal, as opposed to the scaled 
withdrawal, and the total number of 
accidents caused by the 24 month 
withdrawal is approximately 75% greater in 
the un-scaled case.   
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Figure 4-6 Complacency 
 
It is also interesting to note that when the 
model is simulated for a troop withdrawal 
with a reduction in Mission Requirements 
only, and no reduction in Enemy Threat (a 
factor that often cannot be controlled), the 
model still exhibits the same behavior.  The 
only exception occurs when the Enemy 
Threat is not reduced; in this case the total 
 
 
number of Vehicle Accidents will be greater 
than when the Enemy Threat is reduced over 
time. 
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Figure 4-7 Stress 
 
This model could be useful to a policy 
maker who is contemplating whether or not 
to conduct a troop withdrawal, and if so, 
how to conduct it.  The results of this 
simulation would suggest that any troop 
withdrawal must be carefully scaled with a 
concurrent and proportional decrease in 
mission rate and enemy threat in order to 
avoid excessive complacency and fatigue 
that leads to accidents. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The following conclusions are consistent 
with the findings in this study.  The findings 
are derived from three sources; the literature 
review, construction of the model, and 
simulation using the model.  
 
Understanding Delays.  Some of the greatest 
potential for improving safety can be found 
by understanding the dynamic effect of 
various delays in the system.  In this model, 
these delays include the Time to Process 
Lessons, Lessons Implementation Time and 
Time to Implement Immediate Safety Effort.  
These are critical because they speed up the 
Long Term Safety Efforts Loop which 
would therefore facilitate a decrease in the 
Short Term Safety Efforts Loop.   
Balancing Short Term and Long Term 
Safety Efforts is crucial:  Too much focus on 
short term efforts can actually be detrimental 
to safety over the long term, but some short 
term efforts are needed to reduce vehicle 
accidents because of the time delay involved 
with institutional learning and 
doctrine/training change.   
 
Balancing the Mission Rate/OPTEMPO 
with Availability of Troops is paramount to 
accident reduction.  This must occur not 
only at lower-unit level (e.g. Battalion and 
Company levels), but also by war planners 
and decision makers at the highest levels of 
the military.  This has a direct, but 
potentially unnoticed, impact on fatigue, 
complacency and stress which are major 
contributors to accidents. 
 
Troop Exposure to the Enemy Threat.  
Operating Environments with a 
fluctuating/oscillating enemy threat will 
produce fewer vehicle accidents than those 
with a constant (and proportional) enemy 
threat.  This also suggests the benefit of 
rotating Soldiers out more frequently “off 
the line” or on “R&R”.  In addition, shorter 
deployment times with more time off will 
have a critical impact on reducing 
complacency and fatigue which will lead to 
fewer accidents.   
 
Conduct of Accident Investigations.  The 
Army has an outstanding After Action 
Review process that encourages continuous 
double loop learning throughout the 
organization.  This process is made possible 
by open feedback of both positive and 
negative aspects of mission planning and 
execution by subordinates and superiors 
alike.  While this process works well for 
learning from operations and training 
exercises where retribution is rarely taken 
for mistakes made, it is not the case with 
accident investigations.  Since most soldiers 
 
 
believe that the purpose of an accident 
investigation is to assign blame, many 
Soldiers and leaders involved in accident 
investigations are likely to remain silent.  
This is specifically the case with those most 
directly involved in the accident who have 
the most important information to share.  
Therefore, the Army should consider 
adopting a new approach to accident 
investigations that focuses on organizational 
learning in lieu of assigning blame.   
 
Finally, in addition to the insights discussed 
above, this study shows how the field of 
System Dynamics can provide both a 
solution method and tool for understanding 
highly complex, wicked problems that 
involve non-linear feedback.    
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